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harm.19 Much less effect has been given the argument that the broker
is typically paid when the transaction is closed, regardless of the time
when the commission is earned, and that it is a matter of practical expedi-
ency that he should control the transaction to its conclusion.
Against the background of the present increased activity of the real
estate market and the admittedly long-continued practice of brokers in
the selection and completion of prepared forms incident to the closing of
real estate transactions, the Supreme Court of Arkansas has spoken and
thus appraised the public interest while resolving the proprietary conflict
between brokers and attorneys. It is apparent that the circumstances pre-
sented are not peculiar to Arkansas so it is not illogical to suggest that
similar controversies will arise, either again or for the first time, in other
jurisdictions. The significance of the instant decision lies in the fact that
it is the latest one. Since it has viewed all considerations in the light of
the expanded activity, it behooves potential parties to similar disputes,
including the courts which will hear them, to ponder the reasons for this
pronouncement.
Real estate brokers might well consider the obvious fact that, without
regard to the reasons supporting their activity, they are competing with
attorneys. They might well carefully weigh their own convenience and
necessities against the possible alienation of a prominent segment of so-
ciety, with a view toward diminishing, where possible, the area of conflict.
Attorneys, on the other hand, would do well to evaluate the possibility that
the public will construe their attitude as a manifestation of selfishness or
greed; understandably so since the public will ultimately have to pay
for any change. Despite this, attorneys should not forget that it remains
their responsibility to originate dispute when the public interest is threat-
ened. Since the embers of controversy are continually being fanned by
economic pressures, it would be well for both sides, in consideration of
public as well as private interests, on their own initiative, to adopt some
common-sense policies to prevent, or at least to mitigate, future flare-ups.
L. D. SNOW
HUSBAND AND WIF--CONVEYANCES TO HUSBAND AND WIFE-WHETHER
THE PROCEEDS FROM THE SALE OF REAL ESTATE OWNED IN JOINT TENANCY
BY HUSBAND AND WIFE ARE ALSO HELD IN JOINT TENANcY-The question
of whether the proceeds from the sale of land held in joint tenancy were
also held in joint tenancy was presented to an Illinois reviewing court for
19Ingham County Bar Association v. Neller Co., 342 Mich. 214, 69 N. W. (2d)
713, 53 A. L. R. (2d) 777 (1955) ; Caneer v. Martin, 238 S. W. (2d) 828 (Tex. Civ.
App., 1951).
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the first time' in the recent case of Illinois Public Aid Commission v. Stille.
2
Therein, the defendant and her husband had sold certain land which they
had owned as joint tenants and had placed the sale proceeds in a safety de-
posit box.3 Subsequently, the defendant's husband died. The plaintiff, in a
supplementary citation proceeding to discover assets,4 sought to reach one-
half of the proceeds in satisfaction of a judgment debt owed it by the
defendant's spouse. The defendant resisted on the ground that the pro-
ceeds of the sale were held in joint tenancy with right of survivorship and
had become her sole property. The trial court dismissed the citation pro-
ceeding and the plaintiff appealed directly5 to the Supreme Court of Illi-
nois. That tribunal reversed and remanded the case when it concluded
that the proceeds from a completed sale of land owned in joint tenancy
were not automatically taken in joint tenancy by the sellers.
A joint tenancy in personal property must be established in the same
manner as a joint tenancy in realty.6 The person claiming such form of
ownership must establish the intent and the common law unities of time,
title, possession and interest in the property. 7  That such a common law
joint tenancy existed in the immediate case is not to be questioned, but
conformation with applicable statutory requirements must also be shown8
if the arrangement is to be upheld.
The only statutory requirement to be met in the immediate case is
the one embodied in the so-called Joint Rights and Obligations Act.9 One
section of that statute clearly and unequivocably abolishes the right of
1 The Supreme Court treated the instant case as one of first impression and cited
no other case in point. It would appear, however, that the abstract opinion in the
case of Schreiber v. Lovewell, 314 Ill. App. 201, 40 N. E. (2d) 803 (1942), reached
the same conclusion.
2 14 Ill. (2d) 379, 153 N. E. (2d) 59 (1958).
3 The defendant further contended that, by virtue of the terms of the lease to the
safety deposit box, the contents thereof were held in joint tenancy. This conten-
tion was rejected on the ground that the lease did not comply with Ill. Rev. Stat.
1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 76, § 2.
4 This procedure is authorized by Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 110, § 73.
5 Direct appeal is provided for in all cases relating to state revenue or in which
the state is interested, as a party or otherwise: Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch.
110, § 75.
6 In re Wilson's Estate, 336 I. App. 18, 82 N. E. (2d) 684 (1948), affirmed In
404 Ill. 207, 88 N. E. (2d) 662 (1949).
7 Klouda v. Pechousek, 414 Ill. 75, 110 N. E. (2d) 258 (1953) ; Welch v. James,
408 I1. 18, 95 N. E. (2d) 872 (1951) ; Tindall v. Yeats, 392 Ill. 502, 64 N. E. (2d) 903
(1946) ; Porter v. Porter, 381 Ill. 322, 45 N. E. (2d) 635 (1942) ; Hood v. Common-
wealth Trust & Savings Bank, 376 Ill. 413, 34 N. E. (2d) 414 (1941) ; Deslauriers
v. Senesac, 331 Ill. 437, 163 N. E. 327 (1928) ; Liese v. Hentze, 326 Ill. 633, 185 N. E.
428 (1927) ; David v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 Ill. App. 96, 95 N. E.
(2d) 725 (1950).
s David v. Ridgely-Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 Ill. App. 96, 95 N. E. (2d) 725
(1950).
9 111. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 76, § 2.
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survivorship in a joint tenancy of personal property and permits such
right to exist only by way of exception to the general rule. 10 The one
important exception enumerated in the statute is that wherein personal
property is transferred by means of a will or other instrument in writing
which expresses an intention to create a joint tenancy with right of sur-
vivorship in the property so transferred. When some "other instrument
in writing"" is relied upon, such instrument should comply with the gen-
eral requirements of a will in regard to the certainty of description, the
parties and the objective purpose. If the property is money, the amount
should also be specified in the instrument, as of the time the title passes
to the joint tenants.1 2 While the statute does not change the required ele-
ments for the creation of a joint tenancy, it does establish how such a
common law joint tenancy must be evidenced.
The defendant in the instant case made no claim to the existence of
any special writing on the point nor do the reported facts indicate that
there was any provision in writing contained in the sales contract which
could be said to satisfy the statutory requirement or bring the case within
any of the statutory exceptions. Notwithstanding this lack of the required
evidence, the defendant sought to retain the funds by right of survivor-
ship on the basis that the proceeds from the sale of the real estate took on
and assumed the same qualities of survivorship as the property from which
they were derived. The case of Watson v. Watson13 was cited as authority
for this contention. Therein, a husband and wife, who owned land in
joint tenancy, entered into an installment contract to sell the land. The
husband died while the contract was executory to the extent of several
unpaid installments on the price and as to the ultimate conveyance of the
title. The administrator of the husband's estate claimed a portion of the
proceeds which were paid by the vendee to the surviving widow after the
death of her husband. The relevant holding therein ran merely to the
effect that the court would not apply the doctrine of equitable conversion
so as to divest the survivor of her right, by way of survivorship, to the
sums remaining unpaid at death.
There is a basic factual difference between the Watson case and the
one at hand and it is to be found in the status of the two sales contracts
at the time the joint tenant died. In the Watson case, the contract was
still executory on both sides; in the instant case, it had been fully per-
10 In re Wilson's Estate, 404 Ill. 207, 88 N. E. (2d) 662 (1949) ; David v. Ridgely-
Farmers Safe Deposit Co., 342 Ill. App. 96, 95 N. E. (2d) 725 (1950) ; Vaughn v.
Millikin Nat. Bank, 263 Ill. App. 301 (1931).
11 Ill. Rev. Stat. 1959, Vol. 2, Ch. 76, § 2.
12 See the first two cases cited in note 10, ante.
18 5 Ill. (2d) 526, 126 N. E. (2d) 220 (1955).
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formed by all of the parties to it. If the two cases are to be legally dis-
tinguishable, this distinction must provide the justification. But that it
does not is clear when reference is made to the fact that the legislature, in
unequivocably abolishing the right of survivorship in personal property
except when evidenced in statutory form, excepted no particular form or
forms of personal property. 14 It must be concluded, therefore, that the
statute was equally applicable to both cases, so the Watson case should be
treated as an aberration in law.
While the decision in the Watson case, and the one attained in still
another prior Illinois case,'15 represent a deviation from the legislative
mandate in relation to personal property, this deviation, though contrary
to the holding in the majority of cases, is not totally frivolous. If courts
were to apply the statute strictly in all instances, there would be times
when they would achieve results contrary to reason and directly opposite
to the contemplation of the parties. In a majority of the cases, the courts
have construed the statute as requiring compliance with exacting formali-
ties to be insisted upon even though this required apparent disregard of
intent of the parties 6 and their seemingly reasonable efforts to make a
formal statement of such intent. 7 But the harsh and unreasonable result
which could stem from an inflexible application of the statute as written
can be exemplified by consideration of the anomaly that could result in a
situation wherein the joint tenant owners of a building acted to let the
premises or a portion of the space therein. It would appear that, unless
the lease contained a provision respecting the rent paid which satisfied the
statute, the money paid as rent would be held under a tenancy in common,
prior to division, even though the real estate which produced the cash rent
was jointly owned. In the same way, claims to money accruing under
policies of insurance on the premises, or the proceeds received therefrom,
would likewise be held in common, absent an adequate provision in the
policies to cover the point.
It is pertinent to note that, in situations of this character, the per-
sonal property involved is so closely connected and identified with the real
estate from which it is produced that it does violence to the very relation-
ship of the parties and to their apparent intent if the usufruct is to be
14 The legislature in no way indicated that less than all kinds and types of per-
sonal property were to be included in the operation of the statute. The only
exceptions named therein are based on factors other than the intrinsic character
of the personal property.
15 In re Jogminas' Estate, 246 Ill. App. 518 (1927).
16 See notes In 41 Cornell L. Q. 154 and 43 Ill. B. J. 928.
17 Harvey v. United States, 185 F. (2d) 463 (1953) ; In re Sneider's Estate, 12
Ill. App. (2d) 485, 139 N. E. (2d) 651 (1957) ; In re Wilson's Estate, 336 Ill. App.
18, 88 N. E. (2d) 662 (1949) ; In re McIlrath's Estate, 276 Ill. App. 408 (1934).
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treated as a separate asset for the purpose of determining the applicability
of the statute here concerned. So long as the cash is still identifiable as
being the product of the real estate, why should it not be held under the
same form of ownership until the parties clearly demonstrate that it is
their wish to do otherwise? Also to be considered is the fact that the
joint tenancy form of ownership is used, perhaps most commonly used, be-
tween a husband and his wife. Acting as a "poor man's will," it is
uniquely adaptable to that relationship since it provides a practical and
usually an inexpensive way of passing title on death without resort to a
formal will or to the administration of an estate. Under holdings of the
type illustrated by the instant case, however, the exacting formal require-
ments of the statute have worked to destroy, to a great extent, the practical
and dollar-saving features of the joint tenancy. As the law now stands,
it would require the services of a lawyer to establish a joint tenancy at the
outset and further legal services each time an item of property so held was
sold and the proceeds reinvested if continuity in the joint tenancy is to be
achieved.
It is the application, by the court, of the exception enumerated in the
statute that has created the problems discussed above. It cannot be told,
from a simple reading of the legislative language, whether the unyielding
strictness was intended by the legislature or has been developed through
judicial construction and application. The evolution of the idea is aca-
demic; the need of an active community is not. That need calls for legis-
lative enactment and judicial determination sensitive to its requirements.
As a practical proposition, therefore, there is evident occasion to reappraise
the law in this area to make it serve the reasonable expectations and desires
of the community.
N. MERMALL
LANDLORD AND TENANT-LIABILITIES FOR TAXES AND ASSESSMENTS-
WHETHER, ABSENT AGREEMENT ON POINT, LESSEE IS LIABLE FOR INCREASED
REAL ESTATE TAXES ATTRIBUTABLE TO His IMPROVEMENT OF, DEMISED
PREMISES-The Supreme Court of New Jersey dealt with a situation unique
to the appellate tribunals of that state when it decided the case of The
Crewe Corporation v. Feiler.1 The plaintiff therein, as lessor-owner,
and the defendant, as lessee, had entered into a lease of a specified tract
of land and the building thereon for a term of fifteen years which in-
cluded an option to purchase. The premises were industrial in nature.
Immediately after taking possession, the defendant effected a complete
conversion of the building from its industrial character to that of an office
128 N. J. 316, 146 A. (2d) 458 (1958).
